Escaping Nash Inflation

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00196zbMath1047.91027MaRDI QIDQ4542449

Noah Williams, Thomas J. Sargent, In-Koo Cho

Publication date: 2002

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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