Relationships between Borda voting and Zermelo ranking

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0327-7MaRDI QIDQ733784zbMATHOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Lowell Bruce Anderson, Helena Dandurova, James E. Falk, Lana E. Yeganova

Publication date 19 October 2009

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc5830124

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3073477 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Supplement to "A Mathematician's Guide to Popular Sports"
• An extension of Zermelo's model for ranking by paired comparisons
• Chaotic elections! A mathematician looks at voting
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• On the sum-of-ranks winner when losers are removed
• Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
• Solution of a Ranking Problem from Binary Comparisons
• The Perron–Frobenius Theorem and the Ranking of Football Teams
• The Ranking of Incomplete Tournaments: A Mathematician's Guide to Popular Sports
• Tournaments, transitivity and pairwise comparison matrices

Cited in

(4)

• Resistance and conductance in structured Zermelo tournaments
• Using the Borda rule for ranking sets of objects
• An extension of Zermelo's model for ranking by paired comparisons
• The Colley Method is an Extension of the Borda Count

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