Relationships between Borda voting and Zermelo ranking
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Publication:733784
DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0327-7zbMath1184.91079WikidataQ50417120 ScholiaQ50417120MaRDI QIDQ733784
Lowell Bruce Anderson, James E. Falk, Helena Dandurova, Lana E. Yeganova
Publication date: 19 October 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc5830124
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