Relationships between Borda voting and Zermelo ranking

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0327-7zbMATH Open1184.91079OpenAlexW2042963133WikidataQ50417120 ScholiaQ50417120MaRDI QIDQ733784FDOQ733784

Authors: Lowell Bruce Anderson, Helena Dandurova, James E. Falk, Lana E. Yeganova 

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc5830124

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Solution of a Ranking Problem from Binary Comparisons
• Chaotic elections! A mathematician looks at voting
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Tournaments, transitivity and pairwise comparison matrices
• Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
• The Perron–Frobenius Theorem and the Ranking of Football Teams
• A Supplement to "A Mathematician's Guide to Popular Sports"
• The Ranking of Incomplete Tournaments: A Mathematician's Guide to Popular Sports
• On the sum-of-ranks winner when losers are removed
• An extension of Zermelo's model for ranking by paired comparisons

Cited In (4)

• Using the Borda rule for ranking sets of objects
• An extension of Zermelo's model for ranking by paired comparisons
• The Colley Method is an Extension of the Borda Count
• Resistance and conductance in structured Zermelo tournaments

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