Distance restricted manipulation in voting
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Publication:2235758
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Cites work
- A quantitative Gobbard-Satterthwaite theorem without neutrality
- A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
- Barriers to manipulation in voting
- Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules
- Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting
- Control and bribery in voting
- Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Minimizing makespan in a two-machine flow shop with delays and unit-time operations is NP-hard
- Reducibility among combinatorial problems
- Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
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