Distance restricted manipulation in voting
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Publication:2235758
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2021.08.034OpenAlexW3197554753MaRDI QIDQ2235758
Publication date: 21 October 2021
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.03162
Cites Work
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- A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Reducibility among Combinatorial Problems
- Barriers to Manipulation in Voting
- Control and Bribery in Voting
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