Distance restricted manipulation in voting

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2021.08.034OpenAlexW3197554753MaRDI QIDQ2235758

Aditya Anand, Palash Dey

Publication date: 21 October 2021

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.03162

zbMATH Keywords

complexityalgorithmdistancevotingpreferencestheorymanipulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Cites Work

• A quantitative Gobbard-Satterthwaite theorem without neutrality
• Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
• Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules
• Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
• Minimizing makespan in a two-machine flow shop with delays and unit-time operations is NP-hard
• A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Reducibility among Combinatorial Problems
• Barriers to Manipulation in Voting
• Control and Bribery in Voting

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