Efficient, fair, and strategy-proof (re)allocation under network constraints
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Publication:2362197
DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0921-4zbMath1392.91107OpenAlexW1739828730MaRDI QIDQ2362197
Publication date: 6 July 2017
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0921-4
Related Items
Groupstrategyproofness of the egalitarian mechanism for constrained rationing problems, Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem
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