Groupstrategyproofness of the egalitarian mechanism for constrained rationing problems

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.06.002zbMath1415.91173arXiv1107.4566OpenAlexW1669732886MaRDI QIDQ1680106

Jay Sethuraman, Shyam Sundar Chandramouli

Publication date: 22 November 2017

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1107.4566

zbMATH Keywords

egalitarian mechanismconstrained rationing problemsgroupstrategyproofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (2)

Efficient, fair, and strategy-proof (re)allocation under network constraints ⋮ Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem

Cites Work

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• Egalitarianism under earmark constraints
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• A good algorithm for lexicographically optimal flows in multi-terminal networks
• Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints
• One-dimensional mechanism design
• Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

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