Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
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Recommendations
- On the constancy of bribe-proof solutions
- Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
- On the complexity of bribery with distance restrictions
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- The problem of fair division for countably many participants
- A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
- Dynamics in divide the money game with bribing
- Envy-free cake divisions cannot be found by finite protocols
- An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol
- Fair division with binary valuations: one rule to rule them all
Cites work
- An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
- Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
- Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment
- Manipulation through bribes
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
Cited in
(12)- On the constancy of bribe-proof solutions
- Manipulation through bribes
- Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
- Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions
- Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
- Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
- Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations
- Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
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