Strategy-proof partitioning

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.05.004MaRDI QIDQ380879zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Debasis Mishra, Souvik Roy

Publication date 14 November 2013

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612000772?np=y

zbMATH Keywords

intermediate domainmeet social choice functionstrategy-proof partitioning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Applications of game theory (91A80)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
• Aggregation of equivalence relations
• Algebraic aggregation theory
• Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
• Comments on ``Aggregation of equivalence relations by P. C. Fishburn and A. Rubinstein
• Efficient and binary consensus functions on transitively valued relations
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Non-manipulable partitioning
• On the theory of aggregation
• On the use of ordered sets in problems of comparison and consensus of classifications
• Rules for aggregating information
• Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
• Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
• Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
• Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Tops-only domains
• Voting by Committees
• Voting by committees under constraints

Cited in

(7)

• On strategy-proof social choice under categorization
• Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
• On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
• The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
• Non-manipulable partitioning
• A leximin characterization of strategy-proof and non-resolute social choice procedures
• Partitioning strategies for the block Cimmino algorithm

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