Non-manipulable partitioning

DOI10.1142/S1793005712400157MaRDI QIDQ2873494zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Conal Duddy, Juan Perote-Peña, Ashley Piggins

Publication date 24 January 2014

Published in New Mathematics and Natural Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s1793005712400157

zbMATH Keywords

aggregationnon-manipulationpartitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• Aggregation of equivalence relations
• Efficient and binary consensus functions on transitively valued relations
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On the use of ordered sets in problems of comparison and consensus of classifications
• Rules for aggregating information
• Social choice and individual values
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule
• Which worlds are possible? A judgment aggregation problem

Cited in

(7)

• A theorem on aggregating classifications
• Democratic forking: choosing sides with social choice
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5177114 (Why is no real title available?)
• Manipulation of nonimposed, nonoligarchic, nonbinary group decision rules
• Strategy-proof partitioning
• Non-bossy social classification
• Classification aggregation without unanimity

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