Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods

DOI10.3982/TE909MaRDI QIDQ4586114zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alexander Reffgen, Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te909

zbMATH Keywords

additive preferencesmultiple public goodsseparable preferencesstrategy-proofnessvoting under constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Public goods (91B18)

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Cited in

(15)

• Strategy-proof location of public facilities
• Warm-glow giving in networks with multiple public goods
• Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
• Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences
• Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle
• On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
• Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
• Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
• A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings
• Strategy-proof partitioning
• Social Choice Theory
• Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
• Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
• Strategy-proofness and weighted voting
• Efficient and strategy-proof voting over connected coalitions: a possibility result

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