Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.12.001zbMATH Open1458.91058OpenAlexW3025980039MaRDI QIDQ1995472FDOQ1995472

Yves Sprumont, Eric Bahel

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

decomposabilitystrategy-proofnessparticipatory budgetingmonotonic additive preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Individual preferences (91B08)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Voting by Committees
• Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
• Voting by committees under constraints
• Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
• Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods

Cited In (5)

• Strictly Monotonic Preferences
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Monotone strategyproofness
• The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
• Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness

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