Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.12.001MaRDI QIDQ1995472zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eric Bahel, Yves Sprumont

Publication date 23 February 2021

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

decomposabilitystrategy-proofnessparticipatory budgetingmonotonic additive preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Individual preferences (91B08)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2107164 (Why is no real title available?)
• Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
• Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
• Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
• Voting by Committees
• Voting by committees under constraints

Cited in

(5)

• Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness
• Strictly Monotonic Preferences
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 956506 (Why is no real title available?)
• Monotone strategyproofness
• The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness

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