Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
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Cites work
- A Note on the Characterization of Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences
- Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
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- Fair Groves mechanisms
- Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentives in Teams
- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
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- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
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- Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
Cited in
(22)- Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule
- An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
- Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains
- Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions
- Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
- Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
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- No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects
- Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences
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- Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains
- Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency
- A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems
- Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects
- Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences
- Ordinal allocation
- Characterization of \textit{maxmed} mechanisms for multiple objects
- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
- Non-bossiness
- Influence in private-goods allocation
- Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
- Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
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