Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival
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Publication:2685832
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.007OpenAlexW4313334438MaRDI QIDQ2685832
Publication date: 23 February 2023
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.007
Cites Work
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- The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
- Multistage Games with Communication
- Mechanism design with maxmin agents: Theory and an application to bilateral trade
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- Progressive participation
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