Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.007OpenAlexW4313334438MaRDI QIDQ2685832

Daniel F. Garrett

Publication date: 23 February 2023

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.007

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic mechanism designbudget balanceparticipation constraintsdynamic arrivalsrepeated trade

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
• On budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism
• Dynamic screening with limited commitment
• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
• Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values
• Optimal market thickness
• The possibility of efficient mechanisms for trading an indivisible object
• The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Mechanism design with maxmin agents: Theory and an application to bilateral trade
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
• An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism
• Progressive participation

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