Revenue implications of strategic and external auction risk

DOI10.3390/g7010005zbMath1404.91132OpenAlexW2261344189MaRDI QIDQ1651848

Andrea Robbett, Peter Hans Matthews, Michael K. Graham

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7010005

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsexperimental economicsreputationrevenue equivalence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Why can't a woman bid more like a man?
• Do subjects separate (or are they sophisticated)?
• All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
• Explaining overbidding in first price auctions using controlled lotteries
• Just who are you calling risk averse?
• Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
• Auction fever: rising revenue in second-price auction formats

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