On the profitability of reducing competition in all-pay auctions with risk averse bidders
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Recommendations
- Harmful competition in all-pay auctions
- All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
- Effects of risk aversion on all-pay auction with reimbursement
- Competition May reduce the revenue in a first price auction with affiliated private values
- Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences
Cites work
- All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4035521 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3313523 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets
- On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
- Strategic Pricing, Consumer Search and the Number of Firms
Cited in
(6)- Harmful competition in all-pay auctions
- All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study
- Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences
- Effects of risk aversion on all-pay auction with reimbursement
- Competition May reduce the revenue in a first price auction with affiliated private values
- All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
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