All-pay auctions with different forfeits

DOI10.3390/G17010002MaRDI QIDQ7323479zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Benjamin Kang, James Unwin

Publication date 1 September 2026

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/G17010002

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• All-Pay Contests
• All-pay war
• An all-pay auction with a pure-strategy equilibrium
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
• Contests with rank-order spillovers
• Correlation inequalities on some partially ordered sets
• Effect of reimbursement on all-pay auction
• Effects of risk aversion on all-pay auction with reimbursement
• Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources
• Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals
• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• Optimal Auction Design
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• The Herodotus paradox

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