Full surplus extraction by a risk averse seller in correlated environments

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.12.004zbMath1152.91471OpenAlexW2005383425MaRDI QIDQ2496251

Domenico Menicucci

Publication date: 12 July 2006

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.12.004

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionallocative efficiencycorrelated informationrent extractionoptimal auction design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

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• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Continuity in auction design
• Auction design with a risk averse seller
• An optimal auction with correlated values and risk aversion
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design

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