Learning to set the reserve price optimally in laboratory first price auctions
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Publication:1712139
DOI10.3390/G9040079zbMath1419.91310OpenAlexW2898080491WikidataQ129116337 ScholiaQ129116337MaRDI QIDQ1712139
P. Srikant, Priyodorshi Banerjee, Shashwat Khare
Publication date: 21 January 2019
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040079
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
Cites Work
- Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions
- Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
- Constant risk aversion
- A surprise-quiz view of learning in economic experiments
- How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion
- Do Auctioneers Pick Optimal Reserve Prices?
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Curvature of the Probability Weighting Function
- The Probability Weighting Function
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