Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(82)90038-6zbMath1273.91210OpenAlexW2057085101MaRDI QIDQ373779

Vernon L. Smith, James C. Cox, James M. Walker

Publication date: 25 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(82)90038-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites Work

• Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions