A first-price sealed-bid asymmetric auction when two bidders have respective CRRA and general utility functions

DOI10.1155/2021/5592402zbMATH Open1471.91183OpenAlexW3198808562MaRDI QIDQ2232676FDOQ2232676

Shulin Liu, Mingming Gong

Publication date: 8 October 2021

Published in: Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/5592402

Recommendations

• First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk
• A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders
• How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion
• Sealed-bid auctions based on Cobb-Douglas utility function
• Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Asymmetric Auctions
• Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
• Asymmetric first price auctions
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
• Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions

Cited In (2)

• Sealed-bid auctions based on Cobb-Douglas utility function
• Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility

This page was built for publication: A first-price sealed-bid asymmetric auction when two bidders have respective CRRA and general utility functions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2232676)