Ex Post Information in Auctions

DOI10.2307/2297392zbMATH Open0641.90020OpenAlexW2036742981MaRDI QIDQ3783045FDOQ3783045

John G. Riley

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp367.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctionssealed bid auctionbuyers' private informationpositive royalty rates

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cited In (13)

• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations
• The broker-optimal bilateral trading mechanisms with linear contracts
• Goodwill can hurt: a theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions
• Auctions with endogenous opting‐out fees and recursive winning procedures from the Talmud
• Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Optimality and robustness of the English auction
• Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders
• Bilateral trading with contingent contracts
• Merger negotiations and ex-post regret
• Private information revelation in common-value auctions
• Stochastic dominance under Bayesian learning
• Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort

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