Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00224-2MaRDI QIDQ1877164zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Han Hong, Matthew Shum

Publication date 16 August 2004

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00224-2

zbMATH Keywords

convergence ratesinformation aggregationlarge auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information
• Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions
• Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets
• Information revelation in auctions with common and private values
• Information asymmetries in common-value auctions with discrete signals
• Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3733065 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1220667 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1432028 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Asymptotic Statistics
• Common-value auctions with discrete private information
• Estimation When a Parameter is on a Boundary
• Extremes and related properties of random sequences and processes
• Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• Limit Distributions for Order Statistics. I
• Note on the Consistency of the Maximum Likelihood Estimate
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions

Cited in

(7)

• Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
• The impact of competition on prices with numerous firms
• Information, stochastic dominance and bidding: the case of treasury auctions
• Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders
• Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information
• Competitive rational expectations equilibria without apology
• Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions

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