Large Asymmetric First-Price Auctions---A Boundary-Layer Approach

DOI10.1137/140968811zbMath1390.91143OpenAlexW2017607492MaRDI QIDQ5265015

Gadi Fibich, Nir Gavish

Publication date: 21 July 2015

Published in: SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/09b3dddbfb467c01c2bffb3ab3528054158bbb50

zbMATH Keywords

boundary value problemssingular perturbationssimulationsboundary-layer theoryasymmetric auctionsfirst-price auctionsbackward shooting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions

Cites Work

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• Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
• Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
• Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders
• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
• Asymmetric first price auctions
• An elementary proof of the common maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions
• Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Dynamical-Systems Approach
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach

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