Large Asymmetric First-Price Auctions---A Boundary-Layer Approach
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Publication:5265015
DOI10.1137/140968811zbMath1390.91143OpenAlexW2017607492MaRDI QIDQ5265015
Publication date: 21 July 2015
Published in: SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/09b3dddbfb467c01c2bffb3ab3528054158bbb50
boundary value problemssingular perturbationssimulationsboundary-layer theoryasymmetric auctionsfirst-price auctionsbackward shooting
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Cites Work
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- Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
- Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
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- Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
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- Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Dynamical-Systems Approach
- A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
- Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
- Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
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