Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.013zbMath1159.91379OpenAlexW2002982019MaRDI QIDQ1017800

Bernard Lebrun

Publication date: 12 May 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.013

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetrydifferentiabilityauctionssecond-price auctionfirst-price auctionindependent private value modelrevenue equivalence theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions ⋮ Ranking asymmetric auctions ⋮ Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions ⋮ Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values ⋮ Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction ⋮ Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders ⋮ Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations ⋮ Large Asymmetric First-Price Auctions---A Boundary-Layer Approach

Cites Work

• Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders
• Disincentives for cost-reducing investment
• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
• Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
• Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
• Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach

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