Allocation of attention within venture capital firms
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2003.11.006zbMATH Open1105.91307OpenAlexW2018044989WikidataQ59345113 ScholiaQ59345113MaRDI QIDQ706901FDOQ706901
Dean A. Shepherd, Michael J. Armstrong, Moren Lévesque
Publication date: 9 February 2005
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2003.11.006
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Cites Work
Cited In (5)
- OR for entrepreneurial ecosystems: a problem-oriented review and agenda
- A dynamic model for venture capitalists' entry-exit investment decisions
- Selection of entrepreneurs in the venture capital industry: an asymptotic analysis
- Optimal contingent payment mechanisms and entrepreneurial financing decisions
- Venture Capital and the Market for Talent during Booms and Busts
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