A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(02)00144-3zbMATH Open1049.91023OpenAlexW2061809575MaRDI QIDQ1869397FDOQ1869397

Authors: Ramy Elitzur, Arieh Gavious 

Publication date: 10 April 2003

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0377-2217(02)00144-3

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zbMATH Keywords

Game theoryFinanceEntrepreneursOptimal contractsVenture capitalists

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs
• Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective

Cited In (19)

• The optimal multistage effort and contract of VC's joint investment
• The stochastic incentive effect of venture capital in partnership systems with the asymmetric bistable Cobb-Douglas utility
• The role of venture capitalists in reward-based crowdfunding: a game-theoretical analysis
• Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners
• OR for entrepreneurial ecosystems: a problem-oriented review and agenda
• Econometric models of duration data in entrepreneurship with an application to start-ups' time-to-funding by venture capitalists (VCs)
• The performance of venture capital investments: failure risk, valuation uncertainty & venture characteristics
• The optimal exit of staged investment when consider the posterior probability
• Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach *
• Investment and operational decisions for start-up companies: a game theory and Markov decision process approach
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The complementarity effect: effort and sharing in the entrepreneur and venture capital contract
• Selection of entrepreneurs in the venture capital industry: an asymptotic analysis
• An incentive model of venture capitalist's compensation incorporating choices of risk and effort
• Venture investment incentive mechanisms and simulation with venture entrepreneurs having multistage efforts based on fairness preference theory
• A multi-period game model of venture capital based on economic value added
• Multistage effort and the equity structure of venture investment based on reciprocity motivation
• Heterogeneous beliefs and optimal ownership in entrepreneurial financing decisions
• A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs

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