A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(02)00144-3MaRDI QIDQ1869397zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ramy Elitzur, Arieh Gavious

Publication date 10 April 2003

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0377-2217(02)00144-3

zbMATH Keywords

Game theoryFinanceEntrepreneursOptimal contractsVenture capitalists

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

• A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs
• Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective

Cited in

(24)

• The performance of venture capital investments: failure risk, valuation uncertainty \& venture characteristics
• The contract model of two-staged venture capital financing based on double-sized adverse selection
• Multistage effort and the equity structure of venture investment based on reciprocity motivation
• The stochastic incentive effect of venture capital in partnership systems with the asymmetric bistable Cobb-Douglas utility
• An incentive model of venture capitalist's compensation incorporating choices of risk and effort
• OR for entrepreneurial ecosystems: a problem-oriented review and agenda
• The optimal multistage effort and contract of VC's joint investment
• Angel capitalists exit decisions under information asymmetry: IPO or acquisitions
• The principal-agent model in venture investment based on fairness preference
• The role of venture capitalists in reward-based crowdfunding: a game-theoretical analysis
• Selection of entrepreneurs in the venture capital industry: an asymptotic analysis
• FINANCING VENTURES
• Econometric models of duration data in entrepreneurship with an application to start-ups' time-to-funding by venture capitalists (VCs)
• Optimal contingent payment mechanisms and entrepreneurial financing decisions
• Venture investment incentive mechanisms and simulation with venture entrepreneurs having multistage efforts based on fairness preference theory
• The complementarity effect: effort and sharing in the entrepreneur and venture capital contract
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5524753 (Why is no real title available?)
• Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners
• A multi-period game model of venture capital based on economic value added
• Heterogeneous beliefs and optimal ownership in entrepreneurial financing decisions
• The optimal exit of staged investment when consider the posterior probability
• A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs
• Investment and operational decisions for start-up companies: a game theory and Markov decision process approach
• Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach *

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