The role of venture capitalists in reward-based crowdfunding: a game-theoretical analysis
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Publication:6573329
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Cites work
- A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs
- Competitive crowdfunding under asymmetric quality information
- Crowdfunding mechanism comparison when product quality is uncertain
- Entrepreneurial Ability, Venture Investments, and Risk Sharing
- Investment and operational decisions for start-up companies: a game theory and Markov decision process approach
- Multiple agents finitely repeated inspection game with dismissals
- On the fixed and flexible funding mechanisms in reward-based crowdfunding
- Optimal crowdfunding design
- Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach
- Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: linear contracts and double moral hazard
- Pricing strategies and mechanism choice in reward-based crowdfunding
- Selection of entrepreneurs in the venture capital industry: an asymptotic analysis
- The complementarity effect: effort and sharing in the entrepreneur and venture capital contract
- Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach *
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