The role of venture capitalists in reward-based crowdfunding: a game-theoretical analysis

DOI10.1007/S10479-023-05182-ZzbMATH Open1545.91323MaRDI QIDQ6573329FDOQ6573329

Authors: Kuan Zeng 

Publication date: 16 July 2024

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryentrepreneurshipdouble-sided moral hazardventure capitalreward-based crowdfunding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Cites Work

• Multiple agents finitely repeated inspection game with dismissals
• Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: linear contracts and double moral hazard
• A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs
• The complementarity effect: effort and sharing in the entrepreneur and venture capital contract
• Selection of entrepreneurs in the venture capital industry: an asymptotic analysis
• Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach *
• Entrepreneurial Ability, Venture Investments, and Risk Sharing
• Investment and operational decisions for start-up companies: a game theory and Markov decision process approach
• Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach
• Optimal crowdfunding design
• On the fixed and flexible funding mechanisms in reward-based crowdfunding
• Pricing strategies and mechanism choice in reward-based crowdfunding
• Competitive crowdfunding under asymmetric quality information
• Crowdfunding mechanism comparison when product quality is uncertain

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