Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: linear contracts and double moral hazard

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2004.01.021zbMath1071.90504OpenAlexW2158014937MaRDI QIDQ706858

Albert Y. Ha, Gregory A. DeCroix, Charles J. Corbett

Publication date: 9 February 2005

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2004.01.021

zbMATH Keywords

Game theoryEnvironmental managementSupply chain managementCost-of-effort functionsDouble moral hazardIndirect materialsShared savingsSupply contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05)

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• Decentralized Multi-Echelon Supply Chains: Incentives and Information
• Competitive and Cooperative Inventory Policies in a Two-Stage Supply Chain
• Coordinating Investment, Production, and Subcontracting
• Decentralized Supply Chains Subject to Information Delays
• The Quantity Flexibility Contract and Supplier-Customer Incentives
• On Manufacturing/Marketing Incentives

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