Serving many masters: an agent and his principals

DOI10.1007/S00186-018-0652-2MaRDI QIDQ2274149zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shuo Zeng, Moshe Dror

Publication date 19 September 2019

Published in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-018-0652-2

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agentsystem dynamicsMonte-Carlo simulationnoncooperative and cooperative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Noncooperative games (91A10) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3733695 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226097 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2002582 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 876703 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Simplex Method for Function Minimization
• A Study of Multiple Finite-Source Queueing Models
• A survey of the machine interference problem
• Assessing Risks Through the Determination of Rare Event Probabilities
• Common Agency
• Contracting for infrequent restoration and recovery of mission-critical systems
• Cooperation in service systems
• Cores of convex games
• Direct search methods: Then and now
• Dynamic principal agent model based on CMDP
• Formulating principal-agent service contracts for a revenue generating unit
• Game theory
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
• Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
• Newsvendor games: convex optimization of centralized inventory operations
• Optimal maintenance service contract negotiation with aging equipment
• Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: linear contracts and double moral hazard
• Resource Pooling and Cost Allocation Among Independent Service Providers

Cited in

(3)

• Stochastic programming bilevel models for service provision with a balancing coordinator
• Formulating principal-agent service contracts for a revenue generating unit
• A Tale of a Principal and Many, Many Agents

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