Formulating principal-agent service contracts for a revenue generating unit

zbMATH Open1320.91001MaRDI QIDQ2947403FDOQ2947403

Authors: Shuo Zeng, Moshe Dror 

Publication date: 23 September 2015

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Utility theory (91B16)

Cited In (3)

• Principal-agent VCG contracts
• Serving many masters: an agent and his principals
• Optimal design of uptime-guarantee contracts under IGFR valuations and convex costs

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