Cooperation in service systems
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Publication:3098264
DOI10.1287/OPRE.1090.0737zbMATH Open1231.90132OpenAlexW2058588761MaRDI QIDQ3098264FDOQ3098264
Authors: Shoshana Anily, Moshe Haviv 
Publication date: 17 November 2011
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0737
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- On the comparison of Shapley values for variance and standard deviation games
- The Shapley value and the nucleolus of service cost savings games as an application of 1-convexity
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