A fair staff allocation rule for the capacity pooling of multiple call centers

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2013.06.005zbMath1286.91073MaRDI QIDQ2450697

Yulan Wang, Mingming Leng, Pengfei Guo

Publication date: 15 May 2014

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/1607

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley value; cooperative game; call center pooling; square-root safety staffing rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

Related Items

Constructive and blocking power in collaborative transportation

Cites Work

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