A fair staff allocation rule for the capacity pooling of multiple call centers
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Publication:2450697
DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2013.06.005zbMATH Open1286.91073OpenAlexW1982094849MaRDI QIDQ2450697FDOQ2450697
Authors: Pengfei Guo, Mingming Leng, Yulan Wang
Publication date: 15 May 2014
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/1607
Recommendations
Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cited In (3)
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