Principal-Agent Problem with Common Agency Without Communication
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Publication:4579842
DOI10.1137/17M1133609zbMath1396.91377arXiv1706.02936OpenAlexW3125087777MaRDI QIDQ4579842
Zhenjie Ren, Thibaut Mastrolia
Publication date: 10 August 2018
Published in: SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.02936
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Optimal contract for the principal-agent under Knightian uncertainty, Optimal make–take fees for market making regulation, Principal-agent problem with multiple principals, An exit contract optimization problem
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