Optimal contract for the principal-agent under Knightian uncertainty

DOI10.1007/s40305-020-00316-7zbMath1474.91087OpenAlexW3115697111MaRDI QIDQ2656889

Weiyin Fei, Kun-Lun Wang, Chen Fei

Publication date: 17 March 2021

Published in: Journal of the Operations Research Society of China (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-020-00316-7

zbMATH Keywords

behavioral economicsHJB equationprincipal-agentKnightian uncertaintysublinear expectation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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