Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties

DOI10.1007/s00199-021-01362-9zbMath1500.91089OpenAlexW3158277750MaRDI QIDQ2088616

Jaeyoung Sung

Publication date: 6 October 2022

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01362-9

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardoptimal contractmanagerial compensationmean-volatility ambiguityperception asymmetrystock optionvolatility control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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