Contracting under uncertainty: a principal-agent model with ambiguity averse parties

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.008zbMath1390.91230OpenAlexW2791273989WikidataQ130076208 ScholiaQ130076208MaRDI QIDQ1753314

John Quiggin, Jeffrey Jude Kline, Simon Grant

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.008

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent problemlinguistic ambiguitystate-contingent versus output contingent contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (3)

Robustness and approximation for the linear contract design ⋮ Principal-agent problem under the linear contract ⋮ Ambiguity and awareness: a coherent multiple priors model

Cites Work

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• Ambiguous language and common priors
• A matter of interpretation: ambiguous contracts and liquidated damages
• Small worlds: Modeling attitudes toward sources of uncertainty
• Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
• Scale-invariant uncertainty-averse preferences and source-dependent constant relative risk aversion

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