Multiple agents finitely repeated inspection game with dismissals
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Publication:285986
DOI10.1007/S10479-014-1703-6zbMATH Open1339.91018OpenAlexW1977469983MaRDI QIDQ285986FDOQ285986
Publication date: 19 May 2016
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-014-1703-6
Recommendations
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cites Work
- A Stackelberg game model for resource allocation in cargo container security
- Nature plays with dice - terrorists do not: Allocating resources to counter strategic versus probabilistic risks
- Imperfect inspection games over time
- Dismissals and quits in repeated games
- Allocating multiple defensive resources in a zero-sum game setting
- Inspection games with local and global allocation bounds
- Determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game
- Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks
Cited In (5)
- The role of venture capitalists in reward-based crowdfunding: a game-theoretical analysis
- Securing Gates of a Protected Area: A Hybrid Game and Queueing Theory Modeling Approach
- Incorporating monitoring technology and on-site inspections into an \(n\)-person inspection game
- A polynomial-time method to compute all Nash equilibria solutions of a general two-person inspection game
- Player aggregation in the traveling inspector model
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