Multiple agents finitely repeated inspection game with dismissals

DOI10.1007/S10479-014-1703-6MaRDI QIDQ285986zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yael Deutsch, Boaz Golany

Publication date 19 May 2016

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-014-1703-6

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumrepeated gamesresource allocationinspection games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Recursive inspection games
• Playing for time: a sequential inspection game
• Player aggregation in the traveling inspector model
• Inspection games with local and global allocation bounds
• An inspection game with multiple inspectees

Cites work

• A Stackelberg game model for resource allocation in cargo container security
• Allocating multiple defensive resources in a zero-sum game setting
• Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks
• Determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game
• Dismissals and quits in repeated games
• Imperfect inspection games over time
• Inspection games with local and global allocation bounds
• Nature plays with dice - terrorists do not: Allocating resources to counter strategic versus probabilistic risks

Cited in

(7)

• Incorporating monitoring technology and on-site inspections into an \(n\)-person inspection game
• Recursive inspection games
• Player aggregation in the traveling inspector model
• Fire code inspection and compliance: a game-theoretic model between fire inspection agencies and building owners
• A polynomial-time method to compute all Nash equilibria solutions of a general two-person inspection game
• Securing gates of a protected area: a hybrid game and queueing theory modeling approach
• The role of venture capitalists in reward-based crowdfunding: a game-theoretical analysis

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