On the fixed and flexible funding mechanisms in reward-based crowdfunding

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2019.05.019zbMATH Open1430.90356OpenAlexW2946691887WikidataQ127834355 ScholiaQ127834355MaRDI QIDQ2001468FDOQ2001468

Gongbing Bi, Botao Geng, Lindong Liu

Publication date: 3 July 2019

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.05.019

zbMATH Keywords

OR in marketingcrowdfundingthe fixed and the flexible funding mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

Cites Work

• Asymmetric retailers with different moving sequences: group buying vs. individual purchasing
• Group Buying: a new mechanism for selling through social interactions
• Group-buying and channel coordination under asymmetric information
• The informational aspect of the group-buying mechanism

Cited In (10)

• The role of venture capitalists in reward-based crowdfunding: a game-theoretical analysis
• Crowdfunding mechanism comparison if there are altruistic donors
• Pricing strategies and mechanism choice in reward-based crowdfunding
• Calculating the relative importance of condition attributes based on the characteristics of decision rules and attribute reducts: application to crowdfunding
• Optimal crowdfunding design
• A cash‐strapped creator's reward‐based crowdfunding strategies with spot sales
• Platform contract selection and coordination contract design in reward-based crowdfunding
• Financing target and product line design on the flexible and fixed reward crowdfunding
• Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding
• Pricing and quality strategies in crowdfunding with network externality

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