An incentive model of venture capitalist's compensation incorporating choices of risk and effort

MaRDI QIDQ3609971zbMATHFDO

Authors Jiandong Lao, Wenwei Hu, Zhan Li

Publication date 6 March 2009

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardcompensation contractventure capital fund

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5307775
• Incentive contracting for venture capital fund managers
• A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs
• A multi-period game model of venture capital based on economic value added
• The complementarity effect: effort and sharing in the entrepreneur and venture capital contract

Cited in

(10)

• Incentive contracting for venture capital fund managers
• The stochastic incentive effect of venture capital in partnership systems with the asymmetric bistable Cobb-Douglas utility
• Venture investment incentive mechanisms and simulation with venture entrepreneurs having multistage efforts based on fairness preference theory
• Decision-making intervention based venture capital contract model
• The complementarity effect: effort and sharing in the entrepreneur and venture capital contract
• The reputation incentive mechanism of venture capital investment under relative performance evaluation
• Investor competition and project risk in venture capital investments
• Reducing risk and improving incentives in funding entrepreneurs
• A multi-period game model of venture capital based on economic value added
• A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs

This page was built for publication: An incentive model of venture capitalist's compensation incorporating choices of risk and effort

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3609971)