Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.02.010MaRDI QIDQ972876zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Humberto Moreira, Aloisio Araujo

Publication date 21 May 2010

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.010

zbMATH Keywords

Spence-Mirrlees conditionglobal incentive compatibilitydiscrete poolingU-shaped condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Nonparametric adverse selection problems
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3437452 (Why is no real title available?)
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• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
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• Monopoly and product quality
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• On countervailing incentives
• Optimal Nonuniform Prices
• Optimal bunching without optimal control
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Strict monotonicity in comparative statics
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Theorems of Namioka and R. E. Johnson Type for Upper Semicontinuous and Compact Valued Set-Valued Mappings

Cited in

(21)

• Job market signaling and employer learning
• An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection
• Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result
• Monopoly regulation without the Spence-Mirrlees assumption
• Pre-sale information
• Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule
• A necessary optimality condition in two-dimensional screening
• Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models
• Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints
• Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information
• On the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility
• The marginal tariff approach without single-crossing
• A multi-attribute reverse auction model on margin bidding
• Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions
• The mathematics of principal-agent problem with adverse selection
• Method of digraphs for multi-dimensional screening
• Insurance contracts and financial markets
• Complexity of solution structures in nonlinear pricing
• Nonparametric adverse selection problems
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Corrigendum to: ``Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions

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