Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition
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Publication:972876
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.02.010zbMATH Open1245.91034OpenAlexW3121676470MaRDI QIDQ972876FDOQ972876
Humberto Moreira, Aloisio Araujo
Publication date: 21 May 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.010
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
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Cited In (15)
- Job market signaling and employer learning
- An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection
- Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result
- A Multi-Attribute Reverse Auction Model on Margin Bidding
- Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule
- Pre-sale information
- A necessary optimality condition in two-dimensional screening
- Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models
- Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information
- The marginal tariff approach without single-crossing
- Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions
- Method of digraphs for multi-dimensional screening
- Insurance contracts and financial markets
- Complexity of solution structures in nonlinear pricing
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
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