Monopoly regulation without the Spence-Mirrlees assumption

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2008.07.013MaRDI QIDQ1039737zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jean-Charles Rochet

Publication date 23 November 2009

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.07.013

zbMATH Keywords

regulationadverse selectionSpence-Mirrlees condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15)

Recommendations

• Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition
• Multidimensional screening with complementary activities: regulating a monopolist with unknown cost and unknown preference for empire building
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• Optimal regulation with unknown demand and cost functions
• Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3344437 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3365044 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs

Cited in

(9)

• Monopoly regulation in the presence of consumer demand-reduction
• A general solution to the quasi linear screening problem
• Optimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses
• The marginal tariff approach without single-crossing
• Bridging bargaining theory with the regulation of a natural monopoly
• Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions
• Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
• Multidimensional screening with complementary activities: regulating a monopolist with unknown cost and unknown preference for empire building
• Regulating a monopolist with limited funds

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