Monopoly regulation without the Spence-Mirrlees assumption

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2008.07.013zbMATH Open1195.91039OpenAlexW1990197298MaRDI QIDQ1039737FDOQ1039737

Authors: Jean-Charles Rochet 

Publication date: 23 November 2009

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.07.013

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zbMATH Keywords

regulationadverse selectionSpence-Mirrlees condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (9)

• Monopoly regulation in the presence of consumer demand-reduction
• A general solution to the quasi linear screening problem
• Optimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses
• The marginal tariff approach without single-crossing
• Bridging bargaining theory with the regulation of a natural monopoly
• Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions
• Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
• Multidimensional screening with complementary activities: regulating a monopolist with unknown cost and unknown preference for empire building
• Regulating a monopolist with limited funds

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