Optimal regulation with unknown demand and cost functions
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Cites work
Cited in
(19)- A yardstick competition approach to a multi-firm regulation problem under asymmetric information
- Regulatory rule-making with legal challenges
- Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information
- On the interaction between asymmetric demand signal and forecast accuracy information
- On optimal regulation of price and R\&D with asymmetric information
- Regulating oligopolistic competition
- Monopoly regulation without the Spence-Mirrlees assumption
- On the relative performance of alternative regulatory instruments for constraining a firm's profitability
- Optimal regulation of energy network expansion when costs are stochastic
- Regulating a firm under adverse selection and moral hazard in uncertain environment
- Incentive mechanism design for public goods provision: Price cap regulation and optimal regulation
- Deregulation with consensus
- On the optimality of exclusion in multi-dimensional screening
- `Too little' or `Too late': the timing of supply chain demand collaboration
- Using Stock Price Information to Regulate Firms
- Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
- The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After
- Universal service obligations and competition with asymmetric information
- Regulating a monopolist with limited funds
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