Optimal regulation with unknown demand and cost functions

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2482zbMATH Open0920.90038OpenAlexW2022161185MaRDI QIDQ1289259FDOQ1289259

Authors: Mark Armstrong 

Publication date: 27 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2482

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zbMATH Keywords

optimal regulation of a firm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• The organization and scope of agents: Regulating multiproduct industries

Cited In (19)

• Regulatory rule-making with legal challenges
• Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information
• On the interaction between asymmetric demand signal and forecast accuracy information
• On optimal regulation of price and R\&D with asymmetric information
• Regulating oligopolistic competition
• Monopoly regulation without the Spence-Mirrlees assumption
• On the relative performance of alternative regulatory instruments for constraining a firm's profitability
• Optimal regulation of energy network expansion when costs are stochastic
• Regulating a firm under adverse selection and moral hazard in uncertain environment
• Incentive mechanism design for public goods provision: Price cap regulation and optimal regulation
• Deregulation with consensus
• On the optimality of exclusion in multi-dimensional screening
• `Too little' or `Too late': the timing of supply chain demand collaboration
• Using Stock Price Information to Regulate Firms
• Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
• The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After
• Universal service obligations and competition with asymmetric information
• Regulating a monopolist with limited funds
• A yardstick competition approach to a multi-firm regulation problem under asymmetric information

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