Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.02.005MaRDI QIDQ281369zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lucas Rentschler, Theodore L. Turocy

Publication date 11 May 2016

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/57576/1/allpay_20151124.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionscontestsmixed strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
• The all-pay auction with complete information
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• All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals

Cites work

• All-Pay Contests
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
• Common-value auctions with discrete private information
• Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds
• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• Information in conflicts.
• Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
• Multi-player contests with asymmetric information
• Private versus complete information in auctions
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities
• Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price

Cited in

(21)

• Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: complete results
• Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security
• All-pay auctions with ties
• A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information
• All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study
• Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types
• The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes
• First-price auctions with unobservable entry
• Harmful competition in all-pay auctions
• A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders
• On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest
• Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
• The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities
• All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values
• A model of a two-stage all-pay auction
• Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests
• All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals
• An equilibrium characterization of an all-pay auction with certain and uncertain prizes
• Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information

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