Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
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Publication:281369
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.02.005zbMATH Open1369.91072OpenAlexW3124802445MaRDI QIDQ281369FDOQ281369
Authors: Lucas Rentschler, Theodore L. Turocy 
Publication date: 11 May 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/57576/1/allpay_20151124.pdf
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Cites Work
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- Multi-player contests with asymmetric information
- Common-value auctions with discrete private information
Cited In (21)
- Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: complete results
- Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security
- All-pay auctions with ties
- A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information
- Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types
- All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study
- The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes
- First-price auctions with unobservable entry
- Harmful competition in all-pay auctions
- A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders
- On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest
- Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
- The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities
- A model of a two-stage all-pay auction
- All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values
- Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests
- All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals
- An equilibrium characterization of an all-pay auction with certain and uncertain prizes
- Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information
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