Common-value auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders and reserve price

DOI10.1111/J.1742-7363.2013.12012.XzbMATH Open1416.91142OpenAlexW2142510656MaRDI QIDQ4583978FDOQ4583978

Xinyan Shi

Publication date: 29 August 2018

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2013.12012.x

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zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationreserve pricecommon-value auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (7)

• Common-value contests with asymmetric information
• Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
• Reserve price signaling in first-price auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
• An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information
• Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information
• Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach

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