On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
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Publication:633787
DOI10.1007/S10058-009-0099-2zbMATH Open1208.91057OpenAlexW3121250409MaRDI QIDQ633787FDOQ633787
Authors: Vasiliki Skreta 
Publication date: 30 March 2011
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/26019
Recommendations
- Optimal auctions and information disclosure
- Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Revealing information in auctions: the optimal auction versus the second-price auction
- Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Cites Work
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Multistage Games with Communication
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- Optimal Auction Design
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
- On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
- Auction and the informed seller problem
- The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
- Reserve price signaling
- Private information revelation in common-value auctions
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
- The relevance of private information in mechanism design
- First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
- A note on optimal allocation mechanisms
- The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
- Optimal trading mechanisms for an informed seller
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (24)
- How to sell hard information
- Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
- Selling with evidence
- Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning
- Information disclosure and pricing policies for sales of network goods
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
- Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes
- On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
- Revealing information in auctions: the optimal auction versus the second-price auction
- Selling less information for more: garbling with benefits
- Private disclosure with multiple agents
- Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions
- On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers
- Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability
- Optimal auctions and information disclosure
- Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions
- Optimal auction design under non-commitment
- Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
- The value of information concealment
- Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
- Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
- The interval structure of optimal disclosure
- The strategically ignorant principal
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