Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
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Publication:308640
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.06.004zbMath1371.91068OpenAlexW2464071349MaRDI QIDQ308640
Vasiliki Skreta, Frédéric Koessler
Publication date: 6 September 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1517891/
value of informationmechanism designconsumer heterogeneityinformed sellerproduct information disclosure
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (4)
Informed principal problems in bilateral trading ⋮ On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals ⋮ Selling with evidence ⋮ Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
Cites Work
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
- An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
- Reserve price signaling
- A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
- Auction and the informed seller problem
- On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- Optimal Auction Design
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
- The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
- Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
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