Informed seller with taste heterogeneity

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.06.004MaRDI QIDQ308640zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Frédéric Koessler, Vasiliki Skreta

Publication date 6 September 2016

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1517891/

zbMATH Keywords

value of informationmechanism designconsumer heterogeneityinformed sellerproduct information disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
• Selling with evidence
• Auction and the informed seller problem
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Private information revelation in common-value auctions

Cites work

• A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
• An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
• Auction and the informed seller problem
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Mechanism design by an informed principal: private values with transferable utility
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
• Reserve price signaling
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• The Value of Public Information in Monopoly

Cited in

(8)

• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
• Goethe's secret reserve price
• Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
• On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
• How to sell hard information
• The value of information concealment
• Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
• Selling with evidence

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