Informed seller with taste heterogeneity

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.06.004zbMATH Open1371.91068OpenAlexW2464071349MaRDI QIDQ308640FDOQ308640

Authors: Frédéric Koessler, Vasiliki Skreta 

Publication date: 6 September 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1517891/

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• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
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zbMATH Keywords

value of informationmechanism designconsumer heterogeneityinformed sellerproduct information disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Optimal Auction Design
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
• Auction and the informed seller problem
• The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
• Mechanism design by an informed principal: private values with transferable utility
• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
• Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
• An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
• Reserve price signaling

Cited In (8)

• How to sell hard information
• Selling with evidence
• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
• On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
• Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
• Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
• Goethe's secret reserve price
• The value of information concealment

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