Recommendations
Cites work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Auction and the informed seller problem
- Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
- Informational Equilibrium
- Optimal Auction Design
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
Cited in
(17)- The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle
- Auctions with a buy price: the case of reference-dependent preferences
- Auctions with an asking price
- Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
- Bidding off the wall: Why reserve prices may be kept secret
- Reserve price commitments in auctions
- Reserve price signaling in first-price auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
- In the basic auction model, the optimal reserve price may depend on the number of bidders
- Bid signaling in first-price royalty auction
- Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games
- Auction and the informed seller problem
- Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
- Price signatures
- Entry in first-price auctions with signaling
- Corrigendum to ``Reserve price signaling
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis
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