Bid signaling in first-price royalty auction
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Publication:2158659
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110526zbMath1493.91062OpenAlexW4225014175MaRDI QIDQ2158659
Xinyi Xu, Dazhong Wang, Xianjie Zeng
Publication date: 26 July 2022
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110526
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Auctions with a profit sharing contract
- Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs
- Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
- Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
- Log-concave probability and its applications
- REPUTATIONAL BIDDING
- Securities Auctions under Moral Hazard: An Experimental Study*
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
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