Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes

DOI10.3982/TE5104MaRDI QIDQ6180408zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Hugo A. Hopenhayn

Publication date 19 January 2024

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionconsumer surplusinformation designproducer surplus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection
• Imperfect information transmission and adverse selection in asset markets
• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
• On the welfare effects of adverse selection in oligopolistic markets

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 193011 (Why is no real title available?)
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Coarse matching with incomplete information
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
• Robust predictions in games with incomplete information
• Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
• The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards

Cited in

(1)

• Disclosure services and welfare gains in matching markets for indivisible assets

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