Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6180408
DOI10.3982/te5104MaRDI QIDQ6180408
Unnamed Author, Hugo A. Hopenhayn
Publication date: 19 January 2024
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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- Coarse matching with incomplete information
- Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information
- Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
- The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards
- Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
- Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
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