Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes

DOI10.3982/TE5104MaRDI QIDQ6180408FDOQ6180408

Authors: Hugo A. Hopenhayn 

Publication date: 19 January 2024

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionconsumer surplusinformation designproducer surplus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Robust predictions in games with incomplete information
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Coarse matching with incomplete information
• The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach

Cited In (1)

• Disclosure services and welfare gains in matching markets for indivisible assets

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