Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1332MaRDI QIDQ3394926zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hayley H. Chouinard, Jonathan K. Yoder

Publication date 11 September 2009

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol7/iss1/art21

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders
• Reserve prices in repeated auctions
• Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders
• Sequentially optimal auctions
• Reputation in repeated second-price auctions

Cited in

(4)

• If you are offered the right of first refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design
• First price auctions with resale
• Is the newcomer more aggressive when the incumbent is granted a right-of-first-refusal in a procurement auction? Experimental evidence
• Repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders

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