Is the newcomer more aggressive when the incumbent is granted a right-of-first-refusal in a procurement auction? Experimental evidence

DOI10.1007/S11238-014-9438-ZMaRDI QIDQ2353607zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Karine Brisset, François Cochard, François Maréchal

Publication date 15 July 2015

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9438-z

zbMATH Keywords

experimental procurement auctionfirst-price reverse auctionright-of-first-refusalrisk-aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions: an experimental study
• Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal
• If you are offered the right of first refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design
• Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions
• Creating competition out of thin air: An experimental study of right-to-choose auctions

Cited in

(1)

• If you are offered the right of first refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design

This page was built for publication: Is the newcomer more aggressive when the incumbent is granted a right-of-first-refusal in a procurement auction? Experimental evidence

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2353607)